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CONSTUTUTIONAL LAW
HUGER SIMMIER
T-oDoRE B. GuE Au*
Perhaps the most significant decisions rendered in the field of
constitutional law during the period under review deal with the
court's attempt to reconcile the individual's exercise of his con-
stitutional freedoms with the community's duty to preserve law
and order. These cases arise out of so-called "civil rights demon-
strations" and "sit-ins." Also considered during the period under
review were numerous other questions ranging from due process
to special legislation. Several important constitutional questions
were also decided in cases which are reviewed in the article deal-
ing with public corporations.
I. BREACH OF PEACE DECISIONS
The 187 petitioners in the case of Edwards v. Southb Carolinal
were convicted in a Magistrate's Court in Columbia, South Caro-
lina, of the common law crime of breach of the peace. Their con-
viction was sustained by the Richland County Court and subse-
quently affirmed by the South Carolina Supreme Court in a
unanimous decision by Mr. Justice Lewis.
2
The South Carolina Supreme Court in affirming the conviction
found that the acts of the appellants "under all the facts and
circumstances clearly constituted a breach of the peace." These
breach of the peace charges grew out of a "civil rights demon-
stration" held on March 2, 1961, in front of the State Capitol by
a group of approximately 200 Negro college students including
the petitioners. They had been arrested when, in the judgment
of the police officers and municipal officials present, their con-
duct, which consisted largely of singing and parading with plac-
ards, reached the point of imminent violence after the "demon-
strators" had failed to obey the orders of police officers to dis-
burse in order to avoid violence and disorder upon the public
streets and sidewalks. The petitioners then appealed to the
United States Supreme Court which, in an opinion by Mr. Jus-
tice Stewart, reversed the convictions below in the decision under
review.
The courts have for years grappled with the claims of the
right to express unpopular ideas in public places as against
* Sinkler, Gibbs & Simons, Charleston, South Carolina.
1. 372 U.S. 229, 9 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1963).
2. State v. Edwards, 239 S.C. 339, 123 S.E.2d 247 (1961).
39
1
Sinkler and Guerard: Constitutional Law
Published by Scholar Commons,
SouTa CAitoLiNA LAw REviw[
claims of an effective power in local government to keep the
peace and to protect other interests of a civilized community. On
the one hand the state may not unduly suppress free communi-
cation of views under the guise of conserving desirable condi-
tions. On the other hand, when a speaker passes the bounds of
argument or persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot, the
state must be able to act to prevent a breach of the peace. While
the vitality of our traditional civil and political institutions de-
pends upon freedom of speech, that freedom must be exercised
within the constitutional framework of law and order.
The United States Supreme Court has expressed adherence to
a test to determine the rights of these conflicting claims. The
states' power to prevent or punish exists "when clear and present
danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public
streets or other immediate threat to public safety, peace or order
appears .... " In applying this test the court has recognized that
due respect should be given to the findings of local and state
courts more conversant with existing conditions.
In two earlier decisions the United States Supreme Court has
reversed convictions for offenses relating to a breach of the
peace which had been affirmed by the state courts. The disturb-
ance leading to the conviction under consideration in Terminello
v. City of Chicago3 apparently exceeded the disturbance present
in the case under review. However, the Supreme Court's reversal
(in a 5 to 4 decision) was based on a narrow ground, to wit: the
trial court's erroneous definition of the words "breach of the
peace" in its instruction to the jury. In CantweZZ v. Connecticut,4
the defendant was convicted of inciting others to breach the
peace by playing a phonograph record in the presence of two men
who found the views expressed on the record so offensive that
one of them was tempted to strike Cantwell. However, Cantwell
was not personally offensive and, on being told to leave, went
on his way. In reversing the conviction, the Court held that
Cantwell's action "raised no such clear and present menace to
public peace and order as to render him liable to conviction of
the common law offense in question."
The United States Supreme Court sustained a conviction under
a breach of the peace statute in Feiner v. New York. 5 There the
defendant spoke on a public street encouraging audiences to be-
3. 337 U.S. 1, 93 L. Ed. 1131 (1949).
4. 310 U.S. 296, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940).
5. 340 U.S. 315, 95 L. Ed. 295 (1951).
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come divided into hostile camps, interfered with traffic and re-
fused the request of police officers to cease talking.
As pointed out by Mr. Justice Clark in his vigorous dissenting
opinion in the case under review, the pertinent facts giving rise
to the conviction in the case under review cannot be distinguished
in any material aspect from the pertinent facts giving rise to
the conviction in the Feiner case. However, in the Feiner case it
is apparent from the following language in the opinion that the
New York police and New York courts were given credit for
good faith and good judgment not here accorded their South
Carolina counterparts:
Nor in this case can we condemn the considered judgment
of three New York courts approving the means which the
police, faced with a crisis, used in the exercise of their power
and duty to preserve peace and order. The findings of the
State Courts as to the existing situation and imminence of
greater disorder coupled with petitioner's deliberate defiance
of the police officers convince us that we should not reverse
this conviction in the name of free speech.6
There is another aspect to be considered of the decision here
under review. We can all agree that the constitutional guaran-
tees of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and the right to
petition for redress of grievances must not be circumscribed or
limited unless a greater public good clearly demands it. This
does not mean, however, that the exercise of these freedoms
must be protected regardless of the fashion in which they are
exercised. These freedoms cannot be restricted under the guise
6. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in the Feiner case makes it clear
that the United States Supreme Court is influenced by its impression of the
Judiciary of the state from which the appeal arises. He states as follows:
This Court has often emphasized that in the exercise of our authority over
state court decisions the Due Process Clause must not be construed in an
abstract and doctrinaire way by disregarding local conditions. In consider-
ing the degree of respect to be given findings by the highest court of a
State in cases involving the Due Process Clause, the course of decisions by
that Court should be taken into account. Particularly within the area of
due process colloquially called "civil liberties," it is important whether
such a course of decisions reflects a cavalier attitude toward civil liberties or
real regard for them. Only unfamiliarity with its decisions and the out-
look of its judges could generate a notion that the Court of Appeals of
New York is inhospitable to claims of civil liberties or is wanting in re-
spect for this Court's decisions in support of them. It is pertinent, there-
fore, to note that all members of the New York Court accepted the finding
that Feiner was stopped not because the listeners or police officers dis-
agreed with his views but because these officers were honestly concerned
with preventing a breach of the peace.
1963]
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of maintaining law and order, but it does not follow that all
disorder and lawlessness is sanctioned by the Constitution so
long as it is done in the guise of exercising a constitutional
freedom.
The 187 defendants here could have exercised their freedom
of speech more effectively, if not so spectacularly, individually
or in small groups rather than together and simultaneously ac-
companied by singing and handelapping. But they could not
have assured their arrest by exercising their constitutional rights
in a peaceful and orderly manner.
In four cases decided during the period under review, convic-
tions on breach of the peace charges of Negroes participating in
so-called civil rights demonstrations were reviewed by the South
Carolina Supreme Court. Two of these convictions were affirmed
and two were reversed.
The appellants in the case of City of Sumter v. McAllister7
were convicted on a breach of the peace charge when they re-
fused to leave a lunch counter in the City of Sumter, customarily
serving only white customers, after they had been requested to
leave in each instance by the proprietors. The cause of their ar-
rest was merely their refusal to leave. In reversing the convic-
tions, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the record
disclosed no evidence to sustain the conviction of the defendants
here on a breach of the peace charge. As distinguished from the
facts in other cases, here there were no acts of violence committed
or threatened, no interference with normal traffic, no boisterous
conduct and no large crowds of people.
Likewise in the case of City of Sumter v. Lewis,8 the South
Carolina Supreme Court reversed the lower court's convictions of
the defendants on breach of peace charges. The appellants' ar-
rest and conviction was based on their walking back and forth
in front of the Kress store and the Cut Rate drug store on Main
Street in the City of Sumter bearing placards protesting racial
segregation. They were arrested by the sheriff and the chief of
police who concluded that the parading might cause trouble in
view of the tense atmosphere existing as a result of "other inci-
dents." However, the record disclosed that there was no overt
act indicating tension, that there had been no complaint concern-
7. 241 S.C. 355, 128 S.E.2d 419 (1962).
8. 241 S.C. 364, 128 S.E.2d 685 (1962). This case is also noted in the
Criminal Law section at note 23.
[Vol. 16
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ing the appellants, that they were walking quietly and orderly
and without obstructing traffic, and that nothing was said to
them by the arresting officer prior to making the arrests. On
the basis of these facts the Supreme Court held that the record
did not contain facts to support the charge of breach of the
peace.
The defendants who appealed their convictions on breach of
the peace charges in the case of City of Rock Hill v. Henry9 had
been arrested as a result of conduct quite different from the con-
duct apparent from the record in the case of City of Sumter v.
Lewis." Here the defendants had been engaged in singing pa-
triotic and religious songs in a loud and boisterous manner in
the City of Rock Hill in a crowd that overflowed from the side-
walk into the street. The defendants' "demonstrating" was done
in such a loud and boisterous manner that work in the city hall
was disrupted, and they continued their demonstration after
they had been requested by the police to stop. On the basis of
these facts, the South Carolina Supreme Court sustained the
convictions below noting that ".... even praiseworthy acts may be
done at a time and place and in such manner as to be unjustifi-
able and unlawful resulting in a breach of the peace. There is
ample evidence here to support the conclusion that the police
acted in good faith to maintain the public peace, to assure the
availability of the streets for their primary purpose of usability
by the public and to maintain order in the community."
In the case of State v. Fields1 and its companion cases, the
defendants' lower court convictions on breach of the peace charges
were affirmed. There the defendants in three groups totalling
approximately one thousand left the campus of South Carolina
State College in the City of Orangeburg ostensibly to petition
the city officials for a redress of grievances in allegedly denying
to them the right of peaceful assembly and of freedom of speech.
The processions blocked traffic, cluttered the streets, and blocked
the sidewalks rendering them useless for pedestrian traffic, and
forcing pedestrians into the street. As the processions approached
the main business section of the City of Orangeburg, they were
intercepted by police officers and requested to disburse. While
some of the demonstrators complied, many refused, including the
9. 241 S.C. 427, 128 S.E.2d 775 (1962). This case is also cited in the Crimi-
nal Law section at note 27.
10. 241 S.C. 684, 128 S.E.2d 685 (1962).
11. 68 S.C. 148, 46 S.E. 771 (1904).
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defendants who were arrested and charged with the offense of
breach of the peace.
In sustaining the convictions below, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court noted that the constitutional guaranties to which
the defendants are entitled cannot be asserted in such a manner
as to imperil the community and that state action is permitted
"when a clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference
with traffic upon the streets or other immediate threat to public
peace and order appears."
II. ENFORCEMENT OF
TRESPASS STATUTE AGAIN SUSTAINED
The appellant in the case of City of Rock Hill v. Hamm12 was
a Negro who had been convicted in the Recorder's Court in the
City of Rock Hill on the charge of violating the statutory tres-
pass statute, and his conviction was affirmed by the circuit judge.
The charge grew out of the appellant's refusal to leave a lunch
counter at a local ten cent store in the City of Rock Hill after
he had been refused service and requested by the manager to
leave.
In several decisions reviewed in an earlier issue of this Law
Review,18 the South Carolina Supreme Court sustained the en-
forcement of trespass statutes against the charge that state
action in enforcing them was in the furtherance of an unlawful
policy of segregation and thereby constituted state action in
violation of the due process and equal protection provisions of
the fourteenth amendment. Again in this decision the South
Carolina Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier position and sus-
tained the enforcement of the trespass statute there against a
similar attack.
III. PARADE ORDINANCE HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL
In a 1961 decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld
an ordinance of the City of Darlington which prohibited public
parades in the absence of a permit to be issued by the mayor and
city council against the attack that it placed absolute discretion
in the mayor and city council and therefore constituted a prior
12. 241 S.C. 420, 128 S.E.2d 907 (1962).
13. City of Columbia v. Bouie, 239 S.C. 570, 124 S.E.2d 332 (1962) ; City of
Greenville v. Peterson, 239 S.C. 298, 122 S.E.2d 826 (1961) ; City of Charleston
v. Mitchell, 293 S.C. 376, 123 S.E.2d 512 (1961) ; 15 S.C.L. REv. 43 (1963).
[Vol. 16
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restraint upon the exercise of freedom of speech.14 The ordinance
was sustained on the grounds that implicit in the ordinance taken
as a whole were standards which the mayor and city council
must follow. However, the ordinance under a similar attack in
a case decided during the period under review, City of Florence
v. George,'5 contained no such standards either expressly or by
implication. The ordinance merely prohibited parades (except
parades by military forces, the police and fire departments)
"except in accordance with a permit issued by the Chief of
Police...."
The appellants had been convicted in the lower court as a
result of participating in a parade upon the public streets in the
City of Florence protesting claimed grievances against alleged
discriminations. They contended that the ordinance under which
they were convicted was unconstitutional because it rendered the
right of freedom of speech and of assembly upon the public
streets of Florence subject to the uncontrolled will or whim of
the Chief of Police.
The respondents argued that the conviction below should be
upheld upon the authority of the Stanley decision upholding the
City of Darlington ordinance. However, the Supreme Court held
that the facts of the two cases were readily distinguishable be-
cause in the Darlington decision there were implicit standards
and limitations not present in the ordinance under which the
appellants here had been convicted. The South Carolina Supreme
Court therefore held the ordinance unconstitutional and reversed
the convictions below. It also held that the fact that the appel-
lants had not applied for a permit as required by the ordinance
was immaterial.
IV. RIGHT TO BE REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guar-
antees to an accused in a criminal prosecution the assistance of
counsel for his defense. In its 1942 decision in the case of Betts
v. Brady,16 the United States Supreme Court held that the due
process requirements of the fourteenth amendment did not re-
quire the appointment of counsel in all criminal prosecutions in
state courts. The right to be represented by counsel was con-
14. City of Darlington v. Stanley, 239 S.C. 139, 122 S.E.2d 207 (1961).
15. 241 S.C. 77, 127 S.E.2d 210 (1962). This case is also noted in the Ad-
ministrative Law section at note 43 and in the Criminal Law section at note 22.
16. 316 U.S. 455, 86 L. Ed. 1595 (1942).
1963]
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sidered by the South Carolina Supreme Court in three decisions
handed down during the period under review.
In the first rendered decision, Pitt v. State,17 the appellant
had been tried without the assistance of counsel and convicted
of armed robbery before the Charleston County Court of General
Sessions. He subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus which was denied by the lower court. This appeal fol-
lowed. The appellant contended that he was unjustly imprisoned
because he had not been represented by counsel during the course
of his trial.
The Supreme Court rejected the appellant's contention and af-
firmed the order of the lower court on two grounds: (1) It held
that armed robbery being a non-capital offense, the appellant
had not been denied due process because the fourteenth amend-
ment does not require that counsel be appointed to represent a
defendant in a non-capital case in state courts where the circum-
stances of the particular case are not such that the furtherance
of justice would be defeated if counsel were not provided; and
(2) The court found that the defendant, a person of above-aver-
age intelligence with a fifth grade grammar school education
and three years' service in the United States Army, could intel-
ligently and understandingly waive his right to counsel; and that
he had, in fact, done so and had elected voluntarily to go to trial
without counsel.
The two remaining South Carolina cases decided during the
period under review and dealing with the right to counsel actual-
ly involve the question of the performance of court appointed
counsel. In the case of CTosby v. State,"' the appellant based his
claim for a writ of habeas corpus upon his charge that his court-
appointed attorneys inadequately represented him. This charge
was based on his claim that the attorneys had urged him to plead
guilty to the crime of rape in order to avoid the electric chair.
Again the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's refusal to grant the writ of habeas corpus stating that
the effective representation by counsel guaranteed by due process
of law does not mean perfection on the part of the attorney. In-
efficiency of counsel will not ordinarily suffice as grounds for
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus unless it is such as to
shock the conscience of the court and make the court proceedings
17. 240 S.C. 557, 126 S.E.2d 579 (1962). This case is also noted in the
Criminal Law section at note 5.
18. 241 S.C. 40, 126 S.E.2d 843 (1962).
Vol. 16
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a farce and mockery of justice. The charge here, the court held,
amounted to no more than a charge that counsel, properly ap-
pointed, had given bad advice.
The appellant in the case of Moore v. State"9 petitioned the
lower court for a writ of habeas corpus and was granted a hear-
ing as a result. At the hearing the petitioner was given an op-
portunity to present witnesses and to testify in his own behalf
but failed to offer any evidence to support his petition. The
appeal here was from the order of the circuit court dismissing
the petition on the grounds that no showing had been made to
entitle the petitioner to relief.
Appellant contended that he was incompetently represented by
the court appointed counsel who, appellant claimed, was not suf-
ficiently able in eliciting the truth upon cross-examination of
state witnesses. Furthermore, appellant contended that he had
been denied compulsory process for obtaining witnesses.
The Supreme Court considered that the only question properly
before it on this appeal was whether the appellant had made any
showing that he had in fact been deprived the right of compul-
sory process. The Supreme Court, assuming without deciding
that denial of compulsory process is a proper ground for relief
by habeas corpus, held that the burden to show such denial was
upon the appellant and that the appellant had offered no evi-
dence to support that contention. Thus the Supreme Court af-
firmed the lower court.
Subsequent to the rendering of the three decisions discussed
above by the South Carolina Supreme Court and on March 18,
1963, the United States Supreme Court in the case of Gideon v.
Wainwright2" overruled its previous decision in Betts v. Brady.
The defendant in the Gideon case was convicted of a felony by
a Florida state court. Prior to his trial, the defendant had re-
quested that the court appoint a lawyer to defend him. The
Florida court had refused on the grounds that the defendant was
being charged with a non-capital offense, and therefore due pro-
cess did not require the court to appoint counsel to defend him.
The United States Supreme Court reversed and held that the
right to be represented by counsel guaranteed by the sixth
amendment is a right of such fundamental nature that it is pro-
tected from state invasion by the fourteenth amendment.
19. 241 S.C. 279, 128 S.E.2d 109 (1962).
20. 372 U.S. 335, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963). This case is also noted in the
Criminal Law section at note 1.
. 19631
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The impact of the Gideon decision on those states, including
South Carolina, which have held, in line with the Betts decision,
that due process did not require the appointment of counsel in
non-capital cases in state courts will be considerable. Undoubt-
edly, many petitions for writs of habeas corpus have been and
will be filed. New trials in many cases will be impossible as a
practical matter due to the destruction of evidence and the death
of witnesses.
The basis of the United States Supreme Court's holding in
the Gideon case was that there is no real distinction in logic be-
tween a capital and a non-capital case, and that a man's liberty
is to be protected equally with a man's life. We can all agree
with this point of view in theory, but to extend the logic of the
United States Supreme Court, for instance, to include minor
cases involving criminal offenses tried in a magistrate's court,
would be wholly impractical.
V. HABEAS CORPUS DECISIONS
In addition to cases discussed under the question of a defend-
ant's right to be represented by counsel, the Supreme Court has
handed down two other decisions during the period under re-
view dealing with habeas corpus.
In the case of Tilbman v. Manning,21 the lower court had dis-
missed the appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus attack-
ing the validity of his detention. It was dismissed without a
hearing on the grounds that the petition failed to set forth any
basis for the issuance of the writ.
Without going into the factual matters presented, the Supreme
Court concluded that the allegations contained in the petition to-
gether with the facts appended thereto presented a material is-
sue of fact, and that therefore the appellant was entitled to a
hearing on his petition. The court quoted with approval the fol-
lowing language applicable here: "It would seem to be settled
law that when a material issue of fact is presented by habeas
corpus petition, even though the allegations of the petition may
tax credulity, the prisoner must be produced and given a hearing
by the court, where the facts alleged are dehors the record, were
not open to consideration and review on appeal, and constitute
a charge that the accused has been convicted in disregard of his
constitutional rights."
21. 241 S.C. 221, 127 S.E.2d 721 (1962).
[Vol. 16
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In the case of Bowers v. State,22 the circuit judge had denied
the appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the
grounds that it set forth no basis for the issuance of the writ.
Here the appellant in 1950 was sentenced to life imprisonment.
In 1961 he was again sentenced to life imprisonment, and this
second life sentence was directed to run consecutively to the first
life sentence. Again in 1961 he was sentenced to life imprison-
ment for murder, this last sentence to run concurrently with the
former life sentences. The appellant did not appeal from any
of the convictions or sentences.
The only question presented by the appellant in his petition
was whether it is proper to impose a life sentence which is to
run consecutively to a former life sentence. The decision of this
question in appellant's favor would not have entitled him to be
released from the state penitentiary, therefore the Supreme Court
held that it was not necessary to decide the question because
the writ of habeas corpus was not available to the appellant.
In the case of Gary v. Btate,23 the Supreme Court sustained
the order of the lower court dismissing the appellant's petition
for a writ of habeas corpus where the petition was barren of any
allegation of facts showing that the appellant's restraint in the
state penitentiary was illegal. The Supreme Court held that in-
asmuch as the petition failed to state a prima facie case, it was
properly dismissed without a hearing.
VI. SPECIAL ACT DECISIONS
During its 1962 session the General Assembly passed an act
which provided that all roads designated for hard surfacing in
the state highway secondary construction program in Dorchester
County should be selected from a list submitted in writing by
the Board of Directors of Dorchester County and the Road Su-
pervisor of Dorchester County or a majority thereof. The suit
of Knight v. Holling 24 was instituted for the purpose of having
the act declared unconstitutional on the grounds that it was
special legislation where a general law could be made applicable
and therefore violative of article III, section 34, subsection IX
of the South Carolina Constitution. The defendants conceded
that the act was a special law where a general one could be and
has been made applicable, but demurred to the complaint on the
22. 241 S.C. 282, 127 S.E.2d 881 (1962).
23. 241 S.C. 266, 127 S.E.2d 888 (1962).
24. 242 S.C. 1, 129 S.E.2d 746 (1963).
1963]
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grounds that the act was permitted by virtue of article II of the
amendments of The South Carolina Constitution which reads as
follows:
The General Assembly of this State may enact local or
special laws concerning the laying out, opening, altering or
working roads or highways and concerning the providing
for the age at which citizens shall be subject to road duty and
concerning drainage.
In the light of the well-established rule that legislation express-
ly permitted under one provision of the Constitution does not
come within the limitations of subsection IX of section 34 of
article 111,25 defendants argued for the act's validity.
The question basically is one of interpretation, to wit: whether
the amendment was intended to refer only to local county roads
or whether it was intended to include roads within a state-wide
system of roads and highways operated by the South Carolina
State Highway Department. The circuit judge held that the
intent of the amendment was limited to local county roads, and
overruled the demurrer. This appeal followed.
In reaching its decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court
reviewed the history of the amendment which had been proposed
in 1904 and ratified in 1905, long prior to the establishment of
the State Highway Department and of its state-wide system of
roads and highways. The Constitution of 1895, as originally
adopted, included as subsections II and IX of section 34 of article
III express prohibitions against the enactment of local or special
laws "to lay out, open, alter or work roads or highways" (sub-
section II) or "to provide for the age at which citizens shall be
subject to road or other public duty." (subsection IX) The
legislative background of the amendment revealed that its pur-
pose was to repeal the aforesaid express prohibitions of subsec-
tions II and IX against special legislation in order to permit
the General Assembly to provide by special laws for the mainte-
nance and improvement of the roads in the respective counties.
The Supreme Court concluded that the amendment did not repeal
what was originally subsection XI, now subsection IX of section
34, article III, which in general prohibits a special law where
a general law can be made applicable.
25. Ruggles v. Padgett, 240 S.C. 494, 126 S.E.2d 553 (1962). This case is
also noted in the Public Corporations section at note 1. Shelor v. Pace, 151
S.C. 99, 148 S.E. 726 (1929); City of Greenville v. Foster, 101 S.C. 318, 85
S.E. 767 (1915) ; City of Columbia v. Smith, 105 S.C. 348, 89 S.E. 1028 (1916).
[Vol. 16
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Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the purpose and in-
tent of the amendment was to permit special legislation in con-
nection with laying, opening, altering or working county roads
and did not extend to the legislation here which dealt -with a
different matter, to wit: the State Highway Department in the
selection of roads for hard surfacing in its system. The opinion
states that "to give to the amendment the construction for which
Appellants contend would be to extend its scope beyond its in-
tended purpose and beyond the meaning manifest in its expressed
language."
The Supreme Court accordingly affirmed the lower court and
held that the act challenged, not being within the scope of the
amendment, is prohibited by article II, section 34, subsection IX.
In a previous decision 26 the Supreme Court had before it the
question of the authority of the City Council of Greenville to
permit an overhead encroachment upon the city streets by a
parking facility. The Supreme Court held there that the City
of Greenville holds title to the streets involved in trust for the
public for street purposes only and has no authority to permit
them to be used for private purposes, and therefore denied its
right to permit the encroachment.
Subsequently, in 1960, the General Assembly passed legisla-
tion to authorize cities within a certain population range to au-
thorize the construction of parking buildings overhanging the
public streets. This legislation was vetoed by the Governor as
special legislation, among other reasons, limited in fact to the
City of Greenville alone.
Thereafter at its 1961 Session, the General Assembly passed
an act generally empowering a municipality to authorize the
construction of parking facilities which encroach upon and pro-
ject over the public sidewalks.
This 1961 enactment was challenged on constitutional grounds
in the case of Elison v. Cass. 27 The act here provided that no
such parking facility shall be allowed to encroach upon or pro-
ject over any street within the state highway system "but this
provision shall not apply to any such parking facility constructed
or in the process of construction at the time of the passage of
the Act."
26. Sloan v. City of Greenville, 235 S.C. 277, 111 S.E2d 573 (1959), 76
A.L.R. 2d 888 (1959).
27. 241 S.C. 96, 127 S.E.2d 206 (1962).
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The lower court held that the 1961 legislation was unconsti-
tutional in so far as it would allow Simpson and Ellison, the
original promoters of the Greenville parking facility, to encroach
over a state highway. It was conceded that the effect of the
above quoted provision was to permit such encroachment by no
one else inasmuch as they were the only parties engaged in the
construction of a parking facility at the time the act was passed.
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court. It held that
the history of the litigation and legislation here leaves no doubt
that the obvious intention and purposes of the proviso with re-
spect to encroachment upon state highways was to allow Simp-
son and Ellison, with the permission of the City Council, to build
the particular building here in question. The Supreme Court
therefore found that the purpose of the legislation was to give
special treatment to Simpson and Ellison and struck down the
act for that reason stating: "It is, however, implicit in both the
State and Federal Constitutions that legislation may not be dis-
criminatory; that it must give equal protection to all; and that
special legislation granting special benefits to private individuals,
as contrasted with the public at large, is not permissible."
The appellant contended that with the discriminatory provi-
sions struck down, the remainder of the act was separable and
should be allowed to stand. The Supreme Court, however, found
that the history of the legislation. and litigation here leads to
the conclusion that no part of the act would have been passed
except for the purpose of allowing Simpson and Ellison the
privilege of constructing, with the approval of the City Council
of Greenville, the particular building in question. It therefore
concluded that the entire act should be stricken.
The holding here is not based merely upon the prohibition of
special legislation contained in article III, section 34 of the South
Carolina Constitution. It is clear that the legislation here would
have been struck down regardless of the provisions of article III,
section 34 on the grounds that it violates the provisions of the
state and federal constitutions guaranteeing to each citizen the
equal protection of the laws.
Vol. 16
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VII. DELEGATION OF POWER TO DEFINE
CONTRABAND UPHELD
In the case of Oole v. Manning,28 the appellants had pled
guilty in the lower court to conspiracy to violate Section 55-14
of the 1952 Code (now Section 55-383 of the 1962 Code) by fur-
nishing prisoners in the state penitentiary 10,000 tablets of am-
phetamine, a drug which had been declared contraband by the
Director of Prisons. The appellants were sentenced, imprisoned,
and thereafter obtained a writ of habeas corpus to determine the
legality of their confinement. The circuit judge, on hearing the
matter, issued his order denying their prayer for release and
holding the appellants' confinement legal. The appeal to the
Supreme Court was from the said order.
The code section under which the appellants were convicted
empowers the Director of the prison system to declare "any
matter" to be contraband. Matters so determined by the Director
as contraband are then published by the Director "in a con-
spicious place available to visitors at each correctional insti-
tution." If any person furnishes any prisoner under the juris-
diction of the Department of Corrections with any contraband
matter as determined in the aforesaid fashion by the Director,
such person shall be guilty of a felony and subject to a fine or
imprisonment or both.
The appellants contended that the statute was unconstitutional
in that it unlawfully delegated to the Director of Prisons legis-
lative power to determine what is contraband, and thereby the
power to define a crime without providing any standards by
which the Director is to be guided in determining what things
he may declare contraband, thus leaving the matter to the abso-
lute unregulated and undefined discretion of the Director.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute,
under the general law stated as follows:
"It is elementary that the Legislature may not delegate to an
administrative agency its power to make laws. However, no
violence is done to the principle of separation of governmental
power when a law complete in itself declaring a legislative policy
and establishing primary standards for carrying it out or with
proper regard for protection of the public interest and with such
28. 240 S.C. 260, 125 S.E.2d 621 (1962). This case is also noted in the
Administrative Law section beginning at note 10 and in the Criminal Law
section at note 18.
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degree of certainty as the case permits laying down an intelligible
principle to which the administrative agency must conform dele-
gates to the agency the power to prescribe regulations for the
administration and enforcement of that law within its expressed
general purpose."
The difficulty in applying this general law to a given situation
is pointed up by comparing a recent decision of the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court with the case under review.
In its 1955 decision in South Carolina State Highway Dept. v.
Harbin,20 the Supreme Court struck down as an unconstitutional
delegation of power to the State Highway Department the power
given the Department by Section 46-172 of the 1952 Code on the
grounds that the suspension or revocation of licenses provided
for therein was left to the absolute, unregulated, and undefined
discretion of the State Highway Department. Section 46-172
reads as follows:
for cause satisfactory to the Department it may suspend,
cancel or revoke the drivers license of any person for a period
of not more than one (1) year...
The court reached this conclusion although the Highway De-
partment argued that effective legislative standards were im-
posed under existing legislation which disclosed the general pur-
pose of the statute to be to deny a driver's license to those who
by reason of physical or mental affliction are unfit to operate
a motor vehicle and to revoke the licenses of those who by negli-
gence or reckless acts indicated disregard to the safety of others
on the highway. The Highway Department argued from this
that the discretion questioned could only be exercised for a cause
having to do with public safety. However, the court did not
feel that it was at liberty to add such a limitation to the "clear
and unambiguous language of Section 46-172."
Compare the holding in the Harbin decision, with the Supreme
Court's subsequent holding in the case of City of Darlington v.
Stanley,30 which was concerned with an alleged prior restraint
upon freedoms of speech and assembly. There an ordinance of
the City of Darlington was under attack as an unlawful dele-
gation of power because it required persons desiring to parade
on the city streets to apply for a permit whereupon "the Mayor
29. 226 S.C. 585, 86 S.E.2d 466 (1955).
30. 239 S.C. 139, 122 S.E.2d 207 (1961).
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or City Council shall in its discretion issue such permit subject
to the public convenience and public welfare." In the Stanley
decision the court was willing to read into the ordinance a stand-
ard by implication that the Mayor or City Council would be
guided by the safety, comfort and convenience of persons using
the streets in issuing a permit.
In the case under review the statute itself sets up no standards
by which the Director is to be guided, but appears to vest in him
absolute discretion to declare "any matter" to be contraband.
However, in other provisions of the 1960 act (51 Statutes at
Large 1970) of which the code section is a part, there is expressed
a legislative policy that the state shall maintain a modern sys-
tem of prisons where prisoners shall be given humane treatment
and opportunity, encouragement, and training in the matter of
reformation. On the basis of these general statements contained
in the 1960 act, the Supreme Court upheld the statute under at-
tack as a proper delegation to the Director of Prisons "of the
power in the exercise of a reasonable discretion to make adminiis-
trative regulations in that regard appropriate to effectuate the
legislative purpose which in essence was and is the maintenance
of a modern prison system with humane treatment of prisoners,
attention to their welfare and assistance towards their rehabili-
tation." However, there is a vigorous dissent by Justice Bussey
pointing out the difficulty encountered in distinguishing the situ-
ation here from the facts in the Harbin decision.
It would appear reasonable to conclude from the decision here
under review that the South Carolina Supreme Court is following
the modern tendency to be more liberal in permitting grants of
discretion to administrative boards and officers in order to
facilitate the administration of laws as the complexity of eco-
nomic and governmental conditions increases.
VIII. CITY OF COLUMBIA LICENSE
ORDINANCE UPHELD
In the case of City of CoZumbia v. Putnam,3 1 the appellant
had been convicted below for failure to pay for and procure a
business license from the City of Columbia for the Columbia
office of his casualty insurance company. The appellant con-
tended that the ordinance constituted an arbitrary and unreason-
able classification as to his company. To support his contention,
31. 241 S.C. 195, 127 S.E.2d 631 (1962).
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he pointed to the fact that the ordinance charged casualty com-
panies on the basis of a flat percentage of their gross premiums,
while it charged life, health, and hospital insurance companies
on a different basis resulting in a lower license fee for compar-
able amounts of gross premiums.
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction on the grounds that
a municipality is empowered to fix different rates for licenses
where the classifications are different. The fact that one classifi-
cation may pay more proportionately than other classifications
does not of itself make the license fee unreasonable or arbitrary
since this is largely within the discretion of the municipality's
governing body.
IX. "DAMAGING" HELD TO BE "TAKING"
The plaintiffs in the case of Hoffman v. County of Green-
vile86 2 brought an action for damages allegedly inflicted upon
their property by flooding resulting from the county's action in
cutting a drainage ditch across their property and the consequent
collection of surface water from the adjacent area which was
dumped in increased volume upon their property so as to deprive
them of the beneficial use and full enjoyment thereof. The plain-
tiffs contended that the action of the county constituted the tak-
ing of their property for public use, entitling them to just com-
pensation under article I, section 17 of the South Carolina Con-
stitution. On trial below the jury awarded a verdict to the
plaintiffs, and this appeal by the county followed. Although the
lower court verdict was reversed (on grounds not material to
this review), the Supreme Court held that there was evidence of
a taking by the county of the property of the plaintiffs for public
use in violation of article I, section 17.
In this connection the Supreme Court noted that it does not
recognize in the construction of article I, section 17 any distinc-
tion between "taking" and "damaging," but that the constitu-
tional prohibition against taking private property for public
use without just compensation "must have been intended to pro-
tect all the essential elements of ownership which makes property
valuable, including the right of use and enjoyment."
32. 242 S.C. 34, 129 S.E2d 757 (1963).
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X. COURT REFUSES TO ESTABLISH
"PUBLIC POLICY"
The case of Page v. IWinter33 involved an action brought by a
wife for loss of consortium resulting from personal injuries al-
leged to have been inflicted upon her husband through the negli-
gent misconduct of a third person. The lower court sustained a
demurrer to the complaint upon the ground that it stated no
cause of action recognized or existing under the laws of South
Carolina. The appeal here followed.
Beginning with the proposition that recovery by a wife for
loss of consortium resulting from the negligent misconduct of a
third person was not permitted at common law, the Supreme
Court held that adherence to this rule was a part of the public
policy of this state. Consequently, the court concluded that if
the rule is to be changed, it must be changed by the legislature
and not by the courts regardless of how illogical or undersirable
the court may find the rule to be. In reaching its conclusion, the
Supreme Court reiterated its position stated in the case of Rogers
v. Florenoe Printing Co.3 4 wherein the appellant had asked the
court to reject the doctrine of punitive damages as a matter of
public policy.
XI. ACTUAL NOTICE MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS
OF DUE PROCESS
In the case of Tripp v. Tripp" the appellant was the son of
the decedent Raymond B. Tripp by a former marriage. The
decedent's widow had probated his will in Cuyahoga County,
Ohio, and the appellant had been given no formal notice of the
Ohio probate proceedings. However, he had actual knowledge of
their pendency and apparently ample opportunity as a conse-
quence to contest the jurisdiction of the court. The pertinent
Ohio statute required notice of probate proceedings only to per-
sons known "to be residents of the state who would be entitled to
inherit from the testator ... if he had died intestate." The ap-
pellant was not a resident of the State of Ohio.
The appellant had filed in the Probate Court of Spartanburg
County an exemplified copy of the decedent's will which was
admitted to probate there in common form on October 15, 1959,
33. 240 S.C. 516, 126 S.E.2d 570 (1962).
34. 230 S.C. 304, 95 S.E.2d 616 (1956).
35. 240 S.C. 339, 126 S.E.2d 9 (1962).
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and on the same day the appellant gave notive that he required
the will to be proved in due form of law. The respondent con-
tended that the appellant was precluded from contesting the will
in South Carolina because he was barred by the earlier Ohio
proceedings.
The constitutional issue raised here was whether or not the
requirements of due process of law as far as the appellant was
concerned had been complied with in the Ohio probate pro-
ceedings.
The appellant urged, in support of his position, that formal
notice was a requisite to comply with the due process require-
ments. He cited recent United States Supreme Court decisions
in the cases of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank36 and Walker
v. City of Hutchinson37 wherein the Court held that in cases
involving a trustee's accounting and in cases involving condem-
nation of land, due process is no longer satisfied by complying
with the usual publication of notice statutes but requires some
form of actual notice to be given in reasonable fashion to all
persons affected whose whereabouts are known or ascertainable.
The South Carolina Supreme Court in the case under review
held that the due process requirements under the doctrine of the
Mullane decision were met in view of the fact that the appellant
had actual notice. The implication of the decision, however, is
that, absent actual notice, the Ohio probate proceedings would
not have met due process requirements.
XII. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS NOT
DETERMINED
In the case of Heyward v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n 8" the
appellant executor sought to recover income taxes which he had
paid under protest in accordance with a regulation of the South
Carolina Tax Commission. The regulation in question required
that any balance of an installment sale must be reported on the
final return of a deceased taxpayer. In computing the tax in
accordance with the regulation, the executor had paid a larger
amount of taxes than would have been paid if the tax had been
computed in each subsequent year on the basis of installments
36. 339 U.S. 306, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950).
37. 352 U.S. 112, 1 L. Ed. 2d 178 (1956).
38. 240 S.C. 347, 126 S.E.2d 15 (1962). This case is also noted in the Ad-
ministrative Law section at note 32.
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actually received. The Supreme Court held that the Tax Com-
mission had no legal authority to enact the regulation in question
which was, in effect, a new law. It ruled with the appellant
executor on that basis and therefore did not consider his conten-
tion that the Tax Commission's assessment constituted a denial
of due process and of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed
under both the state and federal constitutions, reaffirming its
traditional reluctance to determine constitutional questions "un-
less their determination is essential to a disposition of the case."
In this connection it should be noted that an exception exists
to this general rule in the case of questions of public interest
originally encompassed in an action and which should be decided
for future guidance, however abstract or moot they may have
become in the immediate contest.39
39. Ashmiore v. Greater Greenville Sewer Dist., 211 S.C. 77, 44 S.E2d 88
(1947).
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